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When a promoter, whom we will assume also is the general partner,
creates a new investment and offers it for sale to prospective limited
partners, he expects to be compensated adequately for his efforts in
putting the deal together and making it work, and for assuming the
various risks inherent in the preliminary stages of the venture. One
major objective is to keep the overall tax costs of that compensation
to an absolute minimum.
Obviously, the smaller the tax cost to the partners as a whole, the
more value there will be to divide up among the partners. Less obvi-
ous is the fact that the benefit of any increment in tax savings usually
will inure to the promoter, whether the tax reduction appears on his
tax return or on the tax returns of the investors. This fact is readily
apparent if his individual tax bill is reduced directly, e.g., by convert-
ing what otherwise would be ordinary income into capital gain, or by
deferral. But the promoter also benefits when the tax cost to be borne
by the investor is reduced, or the tax benefits he is to enjoy are in-
creased, e.g., by converting part of the purchase price into ordinary
deductions: the greater the tax benefit promised the limited partners,
the more they will be willing to pay the general partner as a pro-
moter's profit when they make their initial investment.
Thus, there are two basic approaches to the problem. One focuses
on the general partner's receipt of income, and tries to make that re-
ceipt a non-taxable event. Usually, the general partner is given an in-
terest in the partnership or its assets. By carefully shaping the form
of the interest, it is hoped that the general partner will be required
to report its value as income at some future time rather than when he
receives that interest-and, if he is fortunate, as a capital gain. This
technique is the subject considered in cases like Diamond' and
Frazell,2 which involved interests in future profits and deferred inter-
ests in capital.
The other basic approach focuses on the payment by the limited
partners, and attempts to give them immediate deductions from or-
dinary income for part, all, or (where borrowed money is used)
possibly several times their actual cash investment. This is done with-
out affecting the amount or nature of the income reported by the
general partner-his compensation will be ordinary income in the
nature of a promoter's profit in any event. However, by making the
payment deductible, he increases the amount the limited partners
I Diamond v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F. 2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
2 Frazell v. United States, 213 F.Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 335 F. 2d 487
(5th Cir. 1964), reh. denied, 339 F. 2d 885, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), on remand,
239 F. Supp. 885 (1967).
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will be willing to pay him. In effect, the promoter takes advantage
of the investors' higher tax brackets to increase the amount of his
compensation.
With one significant exception, we will not consider compensation
for services rendered by the general partner in connection with the
actual operation of properties after they have been acquired (by pur-
chase, construction, or otherwise). Reasonable fees paid to the gener-
al partner for managing properties in a trade or business or held for
investment seldom present difficult tax questions. However, we will
compare the use of guaranteed payments with one or two alterna-
tives that may be preferable in light of recent decisions and legisla-
tion.
II. DEDUCTING AMOUNTS PAID TO THE
PROMOTER-GENERAL PARTNER WHILE
ACQUIRING THE PROPERTY
What makes the deduction problem acute during the initial phases
of acquiring an investment is the prohibition against any deductions
for capital expenditures. 3 With one minor exception in connection
with organization expenses, this prohibition has been reinforced by
various provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. In most cases, the
ultimate question is whether the expenditure by the limited partners
or by the partnership is not, in substance, a capital expenditure of one
form or another. To a lesser extent, the issue is also complicated by
the reported position of the IRS on material distortions of income
during the first two taxable years of a partnership. 4
A. Guaranteed Payments
1. Payments for services during construction
or other acquisitory phases.
Under §707(c) of the Code, prior to the amendment made by the
1976 Act, there was some basis for claiming that a "guaranteed pay-
ment" made by a partnership to a partner was always deductible by
the partnership. Notwithstanding some technical support for that
view in the legislative history and the regulations, most practitioners
doubted that §707(c) gave carte-blanche to the conversion into ordi-
nary deductions of unlimited amounts of capital and other non-deduc-
tible items, when the issue was litigated, the courts also refused to
accept the argument. The 1976 Act appears to have settled the issue.
Under §707(a), a payment to a partner "other than in his capacity
as a partner" was considered as though made to a person who was
not a partner. The legislative history reveals that this provision was
aimed, inter alia, at resolving certain questions that had arisen under
3 See §263; Reg. §1.263(a); Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Comm'r v.
Idaho Power Co.,418 U.S. I (1974).
4 See Shop Talk, 43 J. TAX. 62 (1975).
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the 1939 Code as to the deductibility of amounts paid as salaries,
commissions or other forms of compensation to partners who ren-
dered services similar to those that would be rendered by employees
or independent contractors, or paid as interest on loans from part-
ners. The regulations properly interpret §707(a) to cover payments
to partners as compensation for services or as interest on loans. 5
The regulations distinguish between a "payment" to a partner in
consideration for services and a "distribution" to a partner. Similar-
ly, the regulations distinguish between transfers of property to the
partnership as loans and transfers of property as contributions of
capital. Contributions and distributions are made by or to partners
acting in their capacity as partners; as a result, §707(a) does not apply
to those transactions.
It usually is possible to determine whether a transfer of property
to a partnership is a loan or contribution of capital (e.g., in the case
of a loan, there will be a maturity date and a fixed obligation to pay
regardless of the profits of the partnership), although even these
criteria may become hazy in some circumstances. However, distin-
guishing payments for services rendered in a capacity other than as
a partner from distributions to partners who are obligated to render
services in their capacity as partners still seems to be a formidable
task, and neither the statute nor the regulations offer any assistance
on the question.6
Subdivision (c) of §707 states a further rule which, when appli-
cable, overrides subdivision (a):
"Guaranteed Payments.-To the extent determined without
regard to the income of the partnership, payments to a part-
ner for services or the use of capital, shall be considered
as made to one who is not a member of the partnership, but
only for the purpose of section 61(a) (relating to gross in-
come) and section 162(a) (relating to trade or business ex-
penses)." [Prior to 1976 amendment.]
This subdivision has alwaysipuzzled the analyst. For example, its
operative provisions do not refer to a "guarantee", other than in the
sense that the payment may be required under the partnership agree-
ment even if there is no income to supply the necessary funds. The
reference to a "payment" for the use of "capital" is inconsistent with
the distinction between "payments" and "distributions" attempted in
the regulations under subdivision (a). There is no clear indicatinn of
5 Reg. § 1.70701 (a).
6 Several years ago, a subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships of the New
York State Bar Association's Tax Section, attempted to recommend possible legis-
lation to clarify the definitional problems of §707. After a full year of discussion among
a number of experienced practitioners, it was not possible to develop a consensus
either of what the law was or of what it should be, and no recommendation emerged.
The major conceptual obstacle was trying to determine when a partner was acting
in his capacity as a partner, either generally or in specific instances.
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what "income" is meant. And the scope of the cross-references to
§§61 and 162 is so ambiguous that it has been the subject of litiga-
tion on numerous occasions. 7
Instead of being helpful, the regulations only confuse the issue
further. For example, if a partner is entitled to 30% of the profits,
but is guaranteed a minimum payment of $3,000, only the portion of
the $3,000 that is in excess of 30% of the profits is deemed a guaran-
teed payment.8 Thus, if the partnership earns more than $10,000, no
part of the distribution to him is governed by §707(c); if the partner-
ship has a loss, the entire $3,000 falls within §707(c); in the remain-
ing cases, only part of the payment tomes within §707(c). Contrary
to the statutory direction that guaranteed payments are payments
made -without regard to the income of the partnership," under the
regulations, it is impossible to tell whether there is a guaranteed pay-
ment or how much it is, without taking into consideration the part-
nership income.
Another pervasive difficulty with §707(c) lies in trying to determine
whether the amount received is part of a partner's share of profits
and losses. If it is, a partner who receives a guaranteed payment may
discover that his share of profits and losses varies each year, depend-
ing on the partnership results. This result can create numerous uncer-
tainties, both outside9 and within subchapter K. The worst possible
disaster might lurk in the rules relating to the allocation to limited
partners of the basis attributable to nonrecourse indebtedness under
§752. If the amount of the guaranteed payment is deemed part of a
partner's percentage interest in profits, that percentage will vary an-
nually, and there is a constant "flip-flop" problem, with possible
constructive distributions of "hot assets" (e.g., depreciation recap-
ture) under §§752(b) and 75 1(b) every year. 10
See, e.g., Carey v. U.S., 427 F.2d 763 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Andrew 0. Miller, Jr., 52 T.C.
752 (1969), appeal dismissed nolle prosse (2d Cir., June 8, 1970); Mallary v. UA., 238
F. Supp. 87 (M.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, (5th Cir. 1965).
8 Reg. §1.707-1(c), example (2); see, also, Rev. Rul. 69-180, 1969-1 C.B. 183.
1 E.g., §401(c)(3)(B), defining "owner-employee" and §4946(a)(1)(C)(ii), defining
"disqualified person" Subsequent to the delivery of this paper, the Tax Court held,
in Hill, Farber & Burrill v. Commissioner, 67 T.C., No. 33 (1976), that for purposes of
§401(c)(3)(B), a partner in a law firm is deemed to be an owner-employee if he receives
more than 10% of the profits for the year as a result of the allocation to him of a share
of the fees paid by a client which he had introduced to the firm. Part of the firm's prof-
its was allocated according to a fixed profit-sharing formula pursuant to which no part-
ner in the nineteen man firm was entitled to 10%; the other part, the amount of which
depended, among other things, on profitability, was allocated to the attorneys who
were responsible for producing the business, and this extra amount caused different
attorneys in different years to receive more than 10% of the profits. Four judges dis-
sented, on the grounds that the latter, contingent portion should be disregarded for
this purpose. This is the first case to consider the issue, and the payments appear to be
outside the scope of either §707(a) or §707(c). It is not clear whether the same rule
would apply to payments under §707(a) or (c).
10 See Parker and Lee, "Constructive Cash Distributions in a Partnership", 41 J.
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Section 707 is derived primarily from a draft of a model income
tax statute prepared by the American Law Institute in February,
1954."1 The ALI Comments (the equivalent to the legislative history)
specifically stated that payments to partners would be deductible by
the partnership only if they were ordinary and necessary, and not
capital in nature.' 2 The Congressional Committee reports on §707
adopted almost all of the ALI language except for the deletion of
this particular statement. It is not clear whether the Congressional
draftsman thought that the rule should be different, or that it was
self-evident and, therefore, unnecessary to state the obvious. 13 The
problem was compounded by what may have been some inadvertent
phrasing in the regulations, which seemed to say that any payment
that met the definition of §707(c) was automatically deductible.' 4
Nevertheless, hardly anyone seriously thought that Congress con-
sciously intended partnerships to be able to deduct payments of a
type that would not be deductible by any other kind of taxpayer.
Yet, to the tax bar's surprise, the IRS so ruled privately a few years
ago, leading everyone to try this route to the creation of extra deduc-
tions. All that had to be done was to provide in the partnership agree-
ment that the partnership would pay the general partner $X during
its first taxable year. If the private ruling and the premise on which
it was based was correct, X could be any number under the sky, and in
practice it usually equalled a major portion of the promoter's profits
for setting up the deal.
As soon as it realized what had happened, the IRS reversed field,
but many taxpayers were already committed. The issue was decided
against the taxpayers in Cagle, Jr.'5 Moreover, §707(c) has been
amended by the 1976 Act to make it clear that, effective for years
ending after 1975, a partnership may not deduct guaranteed payments
unless they meet all of the Code's other requirements for deducti-
bility.' 6 This amendment effectively forecloses the use of guaran-
teed payments to create large front-end deductions for the promoter's
fees.
Tax. 88 (1974), and separate articles by Messrs. Applebaum and Lee elsewhere in
this volume; but see Rev. Rul. 73-300, 1973-2 C.B. 215.
I See §X755, ALI Fed. Inc. Tax Stat. (Feb. 1954 Draft).
12 Id. at 385-386.
" Compare S. Rept. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1954) and H. R. Rept. No.
337. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68, A226-227 (1954), with ALl Fed. Inc. Tax Stat., supra,
at 385-386.
14 Reg. §1.707-1(c). See also Rev. Rul. 69-186, 1969-1 C.B. 285.
15 63 T.C. 86, affd, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir., 1976); see, also, Rev. Rul. 75-214, 1975-1
C.B. 185. Other cases are pending in the courts, raising the same issue. E.g. Blitzer
%. U.S., Ct. Cl. No. 426-76. The Conference Committee Report to the 1976 Act seems
to state that Congress did not intend the 1976 amendment to affect the outcome of
the pre-1976 cases. See Statement of the Managers, H. R. Rept. No. 94-1515, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 421 (Senate Amendment No. 13).
16 Although the statute is still slightly ambiguous, the Committee Report is quite
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2. Subsequent to acquisition
Notwithstanding the judicial and legislative circumscriptions on
the use of guaranteed payments to create deductions for capital
expenditures, they still may seem attractive as a means of compen-
sating the general partner out of deductible dollars for services to
be rendered in operating the property or supervising the partnership
and its assets after acquisition.
If the amounts are reasonable in relationship to the services to
be performed, and would be terminated if those services were not
performed properly, a guaranteed payment as consideration for
services presents no particular problem of deductibility. However,
if the amounts are excessive or are unrelated to the services required,
not only may the payments become non-deductible, but the initial
creation of the interest itself may be taxable.
For example, suppose a real estate partnership agreement pro-
vides that the general partner will receive a fee in consideration of
his services as manager and supervisor of the partnership's assets,
payable as follows after completion of construction:
First taxable year: 50% of gross rent roll
Second taxable year: 25%
Third through tenth taxable
year: 10%
After tenth taxable year: 7%
The payment in the first year seems so far out of line that it calls
for careful scrutiny to see whether, in substance, it is really in consid-
eration for something other than post-construction management ser-
vices. In fact, it is probably a slightly delayed promoter's fee, and in
large part should be disallowed. The same reasoning applies to the
second year's payment. The 10% payment starting in year three also
seems large, and if the usual fee paid to independent managers is
only 6%, the excess should be non-deductible under Cagle and §707(c),
as amended. The 7% fee after year ten may stand up, but probably
only because the abuse has been reduced to a level where an agent
is likely to shrug his shoulders and look to fight elsewhere.
But the agent might also argue that the present worth of all of
the guaranteed payments, to the extent they are in excess of 6%-
and this includes the additional 1% each year after the tenth-dis-
counted to the date the partnership agreement is signed, constitutes
income at that time within the meaning of Diamond.17 To the extent
specific that guaranteed payments are deductible only if ordinary and necessary.
See S. Rept. No. 94-938,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94-96 (1976).
17Note I supra. Compare the arguments made by the IRS in the retained leasehold-
condominium cases; Lakeside Garden Developers, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1976-290. See Emanuel, "Condominium Development and IRS-The Florida Story",
2 REAL ESTATE LAW J. 760 (Spring 1974).
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Diamond requires the present fair market value of an interest in
future profits received in consideration for services to be taxed when
that interest is received (an issue discussed later in this article), it
would seem to apply just as well to the full amount of an interest
in the partnership cast in the form of a guaranteed payment. How-
ever, as explained hereinafter, §83 might restrict the amount that
must be recognized to the portion that would be non-forfeitable
if the general partner failed to perform substantial services.
A serious queston also exists as to whether the fees in this example
would even qualify as guaranteed payments to begin with. Accord-
ing to the Tax Court in Pratt.18 a payment measured by rents cannot
qualify as a guaranteed payment because rents are a form of gross
income; therefore, the payment is determined with regard to income,
contrary to the requirement in §707(c).
3. Alternatives to Guaranteed Payments for Services
Instead of making a guaranteed payment, it may be possible to
allocate income to the general partner equal to what the guaranteed
payment would have been. In the example given above, let us merely
allocate gross rental income equal to 50% of collections the first year,
25% the second year, and so forth.
According to Pratt, gross rent is an item of partnership income, at
least for purposes of §707(c). Presumptively, it is also an item of
income within the meaning of §704(a), and the allocation of that item
of income to the general partners should be valid. It also has "sub-
stantial economic effect" because it in fact is equal to the amount to
be paid the general partner - it affects the actual dollars payable to
him.' 9 Moreover, the source of the payment is the rental income
allocable to him - if there is none, there will be no payment.20
Allocating an item of income to the general partner removes it from
the computation of partnership taxable income or loss allocable to the
other partners; therefore, it has the same "bottom line" impact as a
deduction - except that it need not run the gamut of §162 as an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense.
Does this solve all the problems? It does not, since the Diamond
issue is left hanging over the partnership. Moreover, the assignment
of future income to pay for current services or otherwise satisfy obli-
IX 64 T.C. 203 (1975), on appeal (5th Cir.). Pratt also held that payments for manag-
ing the property were made to the general partners in their capacity as partners,
thereby making §707(a) inapplicable. This part of the decision at first seems to frus-
trate the Congressional intent for §707(a), which was to avoid the necessity of resol-
ving that issue, but as noted above (see note 6), this may be an inherently insoluble
problem.
19 Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2). It may even be possible to allocate gross income in excess
of the cash available for the payment, if the excess is credited to the general partner's
capital account for future distributions when available. This would still seem to have
-substantial economic effect".
20 See Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2).
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gations creates problems even outside the partnership area. For ex-
ample, if rental real estate is sold and the buyer conveys back to the
seller a 2 year rent-free right of occupancy in the premises, the
rental value of the right of occupancy is treated as constructively re-
ceived and applied to the purchase price.2' To the extent that the
limited partner's proper share of future income is to be diverted to
the general partner, assignment of income rules might well super-
sede the usual subchapter K rules. In addition, it is not clear whether
specially allocated income affects the allocation of basis under §752.
Finally, even assuming all of the other problems are overcome,
the income allocation method works only if there is sufficient gross
income to allocate. This limitation may force the parties to spread
the allocation into the second or third taxable years. The loss of
value caused by the deferment can be compensated for by increas-
ing the total amount so allocated. On balance, allocating income in
lieu of making a guaranteed payment does not solve all of the prob-
lems, but it eliminates the principal obstacle, which is §162.
4. Payments for use of capital
Section 707(c) also provides a deduction for payments made to
partners for "the use of capital." Under the 1939 Code, it had been
held that interest payments to partners were not deductible because
no indebtedness could exist between a partner and the partnership.
Section 707(c) was intended to reverse this result.
As noted above, a careful examination of the statutory language
and the regulations indicates that interest on indebtedness between
a partner and a partnership is governed by subdivision (a) of §707.
Subdivision (c) covers distributions with respect to capital contribu-
tions of partners, which are distinguishable from loans. For example,
if the limited partners contribute $100,000 of capital to the partner-
ship and the general partner contributes only nominal amounts,
the partnership agreement may provide that the limited partners
will receive a 6% return on their capital investment before the balance
of the profits are divided. This 6% return is not interest, because
there is no debt - there is no obligation to pay, no maturity date,
and no priority over or parity with other creditors. Subdivision (c)
applies to the payment. If there were more indicia of indebtedness,
subdivision (a) would apply. 22
21 Alstores Realty Corp., 46 T.C. 363 (1966). Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-657, 1970-2 C.B. 70
where the taxpayer paid 100% of the drilling expenses in a well, and received only a
50% interest. He was allowed to deduct only one-half of the intangible drilling expenses.
The other half was deemed the purchase price for his one-half interest. Although analo-
gies from the oil and gas field to other areas of the tax law are often tenuous, the prin-
ciple of the ruling (and its antecedents) suggests that a non-pro rata division of income
and expenses may often be viewed as a substitute for part of the purchase price of the
property interest involved.
22 Another noteworthy feature of §707(c) as it applies to payments for use of capi-
tal is that deductibility is determined under §162, relating to business expenses, rather
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However, in Pratt, supra, the Tax Court, in what was probably
only dictum, stated that interest on indebtedness to a partner is a
guaranteed payment. The issue had not been researched or argued
by the attorneys, who merely assumed that this was the correct result,
and the court accepted their assertions to this effect.
Where the general partner has contributed property, such as a
contract to purchase real estate, it may be possible in certain cases
to give him a guaranteed payment under §707(c) for the use of his
capital. There does not seem to be any specific limit on the rate of
return. Thus, conceivably it may be permissible to pay him at a rate
that would be considered usurious if the relationship were truly that
of a debtor and creditor. If interest is a §707(c) guaranteed payment,
as indicated in Pratt, the rule also would apply to any loans a general
partner makes to the partnership.
However, under the 1976 Act amendment, it is clear that guaran-
teed payments are now subject to the "ordinary and necessary" limi-
tations in §162. Notwithstanding continuing deficiencies in the statu-
tory language, this stipulation should cover interest-type payments
as well. This may be sufficient to limit deductions for "usurious"
payments. 23
As in the case of all other types of payments to the general part-
ner, questions of substance over form will continue to exist: is the
guaranteed payment in fact for the use of capital, or is it a disguise
for something else, such as a promoteres fee? And if the payment is
deemed excessive, the present discount value of the excess may be
deemed an interest in profits within the meaning of Diamond case.
B. Supervisory and Consulting Services
Many partnerships categorize payments to the general partner
during the acquisitive and organizational stages as fees for consult-
ing and supervisory services. Typically, the general partner-promoter
agrees to "supervise" the partnership's affairs and render various
consulting services about proposed acquisitions and their financing,
the employment of attorneys, architects, engineers and accountants,
the availability of tax abatements and subsidiaries, techniques for ob-
taining zoning variances and similar matters. Now that it is clear that
guaranteed payments do not automatically produce deductions, it
than §163, relating to interest expenses. Thus, the restrictions on "investment interest"
in §163(d) seem to be inapplicable. The Committee Reports indicate that it was the
legislative intention to subject all guaranteed payments to the same criteria for deduc-
tibility as payment to third parties. See S. Rept. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1976);
H. R. Rept. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976). Payments to third parties for the
use of money would be subject to §163 and the restrictions on the deductibility of "in-
vestment interest" The regulations may have to address themselves to this inconsist-
ency.
23 Not all usurious interest payments are non-deductible. See Arthur R. Jones Syndi-
cate v. Comm'r, 23 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1927).
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may be expected that many partnerships will increase their efforts
to claim that these items are deductible under §§162 or 212.
In Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner,24 a utility company used
its own construction and transportation equipment in the construc-
tion of a new facility. It conceded that wages paid employees involved
in construction had to be capitalized, but claimed that it did not have
to capitalize depreciation of the equipment. Under the rules of the
FPC and the Idaho Public Utility Commission, the depreciation had to
be capitalized. 25 The IRS stipulated or conceded that motor vehi-
cle taxes, social security taxes and contributions to qualified pension
plans26 could be deducted during construction (this was before the
1976 Act changed the rules for taxes during construction).
As to all other items, the Supreme Court upheld the IRS and
noted 27:
"There can be little question that other construction related
expense items, such as tools, materials, and wages paid con-
struction workers, are to be treated as part of the cost of
acquisition of a capital asset. . . when wages are paid in con-
nection with the construction or acquisition of a capital
asset, they must be capitalized and are then entitled to be
amortized over the life of the capital assets so acquired. .. "
Under this approach, if a corporation constructs a building, it
should allocate a portion of its overhead, 28 including salaries of its
executives and home offices expenses, and capitalize it.
In Cagle, the general partner engaged in supervisory and con-
sulting activities29:
"The services actually performed. . .were a feasibility study
of the office-showroom development which included econo-
mic forecasts, market potential, budget and project costs,
and anticipated rents; work with the architects on the pre-
liminary plans of the office-showroom complex; work with
the construction general contractors with respect to the cost
of the project and coordination of the architecture and con-
struction thereof; and the arranging of financing using his
own credit to some extent. No portion of the management
24 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
25 In fact, the Uniform System of Accounts required by most regulatory agencies
requires utilities to capitalize all overhead and indirect costs during construction,
including construction loan interest. If the utility does not use borrowed money dur-
ing construction, it must capitalize the value of the use of its own money. See, e.g.,
16 N.Y. Code, Rules and Reg. §168.3(17).26 See IT 3408, 1940-2 C.B. 178. Contributions to accident and health plans may
also be deducted during construction.
27 418 U.S. at 13.
2" See, also, Variety Constr. Co., T.C. Memo 1962-257 (21 T.C.M. 1391), and Rev.
Rul. 67-75, 1967-1 C.B.41.
29 63 T.C., at 89.
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fee was for managing the property after it was completed.
Rather it was for work done at the inception and during
the development of the office-showroom complex..."
The Tax Court specifically followed Idaho Power in holding non-
deductible payments for these items, including payments for "super-
vision and administration" during construction, advice "with respect
to economic planning, feasibility, market analysis and the approach
and appeal with respect to the development of the . . . property"
and the providing of "techniques regarding financial, accounting and
other technical aspects applicable to the development and operation
of the property." 30 In practice, overhead and similar indirect expenses
are probably not capitalized except by utilities, but there certainly
does not seem to be any authority for deducting supervisory and
consulting services during construction.
C. Rent- Up Fees
A common attempt to use deductible dollars to compensate the
general partner in real estate deals is the payment of leasing com-
missions or fees for obtaining tenants for the premises. The general
partner agrees to rent up the new property in consideration of, say,
8% of the annual rental provided in the leases. This could well repre-
sent a major portion of the investors' purchase price.
If the leases are for more than one year at a time, leasing com-
missions must be amortized. In general, there does not seem to be
any specific requirement that the cost of leasing a property for one
year or less where the lease term goes beyond the close of the taxable
year must be allocated between the two years.31
However, even assuming that the leases are all for terms that expire
in the taxable year in which they are executed, or that they are all for
one year or less and the costs of such leases can be deducted immedi-
ately, several questions persist:
(1) Is the amount of the commission reasonable - i.e., what would
an independent third party charge?
(2) Do the general partners in fact render the services, or do
outside renting agents do the work and also charge commissions?
(3) Is renting-up an entire building an ordinary and necessary
expense, or is it capital in nature? Since an empty building cannot
30 To the extent the services related to financing problems, Cagle held that they had
to be capitalized and amortized over the term of the loan.
31 Reg. 1.461-1(a)(1) states that "[i]f an expenditure results in the creation of an
asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable
year, such an expenditure may not be deductible, or may be deductible only in part,
for the taxable year in which made." (Emphasis added.) Annual insurance premiums
do not have to be allocated between the current year and the succeeding year. Kauai
Terminal Ltd., 36 BTA 893 (1937) (acq.); I.L. Bell, 13 T.C. 344 (1949) (acq.). It would
seem that, under ordinary circumstances, annual leasing commissions on one year
leases should be treated the same way.
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produce income, it still may be incomplete and the initial cost of
installing tenants may be regarded as part of the cost of creating
an economic asset of value. Thus, mortgagees usually regard initial
rent-up expenses as part of the cost of construction.
(4) Even if the leases are all for short terms, can the expectancy
that most will be renewed make their useful lives indeterminate and
require their costs to be amortized over the life of the building?
As in most other cases, the IRS may not challenge the deductions
as long as the individual amounts are comparable to the amounts paid
third parties for equivalent services and the total is modest, but
overreaching may spur the Government to develop countervailing
principles, including, perhaps, the material distortion of income
approach and the capitalization of rent-up costs.
D. Cash Flow Guarantees
In several instances, partnerships have paid the general partner
for guaranteeing to contribute capital if the operating revenues are
insufficient to pay expenses and debt service and, perhaps, provide
a minimum return to the investors. Some support for this approach
seemed to be created by the lower court decision in Tulia Feedlot, Inc.
v. United States.32
The stockholders of the corporation, in proportion to their holdings,
guaranteed a bank loan to the corporation, for which the corporation
paid them 3% of the indebtedness annually. There was some evidence
that the bank would not have made the loan to the corporation at
the agreed interest rate without the guarantees. The lower court
held that 3% was a reasonable fee and that the corporation could
deduct it in the year paid as a business expense. The appellate court
reversed on the grounds that there was insufficient proof of rea-
sonableness; it also was somewhat skeptical about the substance of
the payment, suggesting that it looked like a dividend. The opinions
leave open the possibility that a partnership could deduct comparable
payments, such as fees for guarantees of sufficient cash to pay debts
and expenses, if reasonableness were established.33
In Cagle, the court stated that payments to the general partner
for use of his personal credit in arranging financing were not deduc-
tible, since the mortgage was nonrecourse and it was obvious that
his personal credit was not involved. On the other hand, if the agree-
ment to pay the mortgage is sufficient to make the general partner
liable, the limited partners might lose credit for the mortgage in
computing their basis under §752, a result that the partners would
find least desirable. Possibly, the general partner could restrict his
guarantee in some way so that he is not deemed to be liable on the
32 366 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 513 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1975).
T There are some earlier Tax Court cases cited in Tulia Feedlot that would also
support the deduction.
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mortgage, or on so much of it that would destroy the deductions
of the limited partners.
The principal argument for deductibility is that the payment is in
the nature of insurance against loss of income and, therefore, quali-
fies as a business expense under § 162 or as a comparable deduction
under §212. The argument against deductibility of any payment for
guarantees of the general partner is that the payment is merely part
of the purchase price for the investment, and that there is no business
need to pay the general partner separately for the guarantee. If the
guarantee is made, not in the promoter's capacity as a partner, but
as a seller or insurer, the payment should be treated as if made to a
third party. Since a payment to a third party for income insurance
presumably would be deductible, §707(a) requires that the payment
for the guarantee be deductible even though paid to a partner.
The basic question is whether one can deduct the cost of a guar-
antee made by an unrelated seller, or whether the cost would be
deemed part of the purchase price of the asset. Several years ago,
a number of excise tax cases raised a similar question. In General
Motors Corp. v. United States,34 the leading case, a refrigerator
manufacturer charged a separate amount for a 5 year warranty and
claimed that that charge was not part of the purchase price for the
refrigerator subject to the manufacturer's excise tax. The Court of
Claims held that it was taxable as part of the price, because it was
the custom in the trade to include a warranty of the refrigerator
when it was sold. If the analogy is applicable to tax shelters, deduc-
tibility would depend on whether it is customary for general partners
to agree to provide the cash needed to cover operating deficits for
several years. While many promoters will enter into such agreements,
others do not, and it is difficult to conclude that there is any custom.
Even if it qualifies as insurance rather than. as part of the purchase
price, a premium for more than one year of coverage should be amor-
tized over the life of the "policy", and the costs must be reasonable
in relation to the duration and amount of coverage. The parameters
remain unclear on this type of deduction.
E. Commitment Fees
Commitment fees are deductible. 35 It does not appear that the
1976 Act changes this treatment, even during construction. Can the
partnership pay a "commitment fee" to the general partner for his
agreement to obtain the financing? In Cagle, the court rejected a de-
duction, probably because it looked more like a brokerage fee for ob-
taining a loan than a commitment fee.
The rulings which hold commitment fees deductible are addressed
mainly to amounts paid to lending institutions to keep funds on a
34 142 Ct. CI. 842, 163 F. Supp. 854 (1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 866.
35 Rev. Rul. 56-136, 1956-1 C.B. 92; Rev. Rul. 54-43, 1954-1 C.B. 119; Rev. Rul.
69-455; 1969-2 C.B. 9.
TAX CONFERENCE
stand-by basis. Historically, lending institutions realized substantially
lower yields on funds held on stand-by status, and the commitment
fee was partially, if not entirely, in the nature of a substitute for that
lost yield, or for the lending institution's "forebearance" from invest-
ing its own money in a higher-yielding but less liquid form. The same
considerations do not apply to a general partner who has no funds
standing by. Moreover, the cases and statute now make it clear that
a fee paid to a partner may be deducted only if it is reasonable in
amount. If the partnership would be able to obtain financing from
a lending institution at no fee, or at a low fee, the general partner
cannot justify charging the partnership any higher fee, unless he him-
self will supply a substantial part of the funds.
Thus, the commitment fee approach probably works only to the
extent the general partner agrees to supply at a reasonable cost
funds in excess of those to be supplied by the regular lending insti-
tutions - e.g., a second mortgage to cover cost overruns - and is in a
position to fulfill that obligation if necessary.
F. Cost Overruns
If the general partner agrees to cover cost overruns, can he or any-
one else at least deduct them? While this question does not involve
compensation to the general partner, the issue is of equal importance
and the deduction, if available, would have the same impact as the
other deductions discussed herein.
At first glance, it seems that cost overruns are not deductible,
since they are merely additional capital costs. However, assume that
the general partner forms a separate subchapter S corporation to
engage in the construction and sale of real property improvements.
As its first (and perhaps last) transaction, it enters into a turnkey
contract to construct the contemplated building for the partnership.
The corporation sub-contracts the actual construction, pays for any
cost overruns, and delivers the completed building to the partnership
at the contract price. It would appear that the general partner would
be entitled to deduct the corporation's loss on the transaction when
he contributes the additional capital to cover the loss to this corpora-
tion. Instead of contributing the cost of the overrun to the partner-
ship, he has contributed it to the capital of his subchapter S corpora-
tion, but he has obtained a deduction for it.
Assuming that the arrangements are bona fide and that the cost
overrun was not deliberately built into the transaction, this approach
might well be successful. 36 The bona fides of the arrangement might
be supported by the fact that the general partner will receive no cred-
36 Care must be taken that, if this is deemed a turnkey contract, the partnership
still is entitled to construction write-offs for interest, taxes and ground rents. It
should own the land during construction and be the debtor on the construction loan.
Take-downs on the construction loan can be advanced to the builder as deposits
or other payments on the contracts, without interest.
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it from the partnership, either in the form of an increased capital
account or a larger share of profits and losses, for his contribution
to the corporation's capital. Also, there must be a reasonable pros-
pect for the subchapter S corporation to make and keep a profit on
the construction contract.
Can the limited partners become additional shareholders of the
subchapter S corporation and divert part of their purchase price into
the cost-overrun deduction? While it may be possible to work out
the mechanics, §§267 and 707(b) would prevent partners holding
more than 50% of the partnership interests from participating; even
then, the arrangement may be strong evidence of a lack of bona fides.
H. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Another technique with growing recent popularity is to pay the
general partner not to compete with the partnership. Actually, in a
real estate venture, a non-compete clause may be very valuable since
many a housing project or shopping center has foundered because
the same general partner has constructed too many other projects
or centers in the same vicinity.
The issue is how much is reasonable for the agreement, and this
may be almost impossible to determine. If the payment is for an indef-
inite period of time or for a period substantially equal to the esti-
mated useful life of the property, it will probably stand up, but front-
end payments will have to be amortized over the life of the covenant,
or of the building, which creates no particular tax advantage. How-
ever, if the covenant only rume one or two years, the same issue of
substance over form may arise. Is it in substance what it purports to
be? Alternatively, as in the case of the rent-up fees, is it part of the
cost of establishing a viable, fully rented property and, therefore,
some form of good will?
In most contexts, the IRS and the courts will respect an allo-
cation to a covenant not to compete because the parties to the cov-
enant have opposing interests - what is good for one is usually unat-
tractive to the other - and it is assumed, perhaps naively, that these
competing interests will keep the allocations within reasonable
bounds. Such countervailing interests do not exist in the partnership
context; both parties to the transaction gain by allocating as much
as possible to the covenant not to compete. Accordingly, it can be
expected that the IRS is more likely to scrutinize the value placed
on the covenant by the parties. Nevertheless, assuming that the cov-
enant really hinders the general partner from doing what he might
otherwise find very natural to do, it may be extremely difficult for
the IRS to disallow the deduction, primarily because the covenant
has real value to the partnership and, within rather liberal limits,
there is no realistic way to dispute the value placed on it by the par-
ties themselves. On the other hand, if the general partner is not
himself in the construction business, or is not sufficiently experi-
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enced to put together an entire project starting with site location,
it may be difficult to justify any substantial payment to the general
partner for such a covenant.
I. REDUCED RENTALS
In lieu of deducting the payments to the general partner, one ap-
proach often seen in major shopping center sale-leasebacks is the
negative rent flow method. Technically, this method does not always
involve compensation to the promoter unless he inserts himself in the
chain of title, but, like the cost overrun point, it is discussed here
because the objective and impact is similar to those being considered.
In simplified terms, the selling price is reduced, say, by mortgage
amortization otherwise payable for the first five years. The mortgage
is also reduced by this amount, and amortization during the first
five years eliminated. The rent payable for the same period of time
is reduced by an equal amount. The result is to reduce rental income
and mortgage amortization equally, thus keeping the net cash flow
to the purchaser the same, but reducing the reportable income for
tax purposes.
The economic effect is to "deduct" that part of the purchase
price equal to the amortization for the first five years. In some cases,
this "deductible" portion does not have to be contributed by the
limited partners until the subsequent years. The rent paid by the
seller-lessee may not even be adequate to pay debt service, and the
partners appear to be making capital contributions to pay the defi-
ciencies.
In Alstores Realty 37 , the court required the parties to a sale-lease-
back to treat the lump sum value of the difference between the fair
rental and the actual rent as constructively received at the closing
(because that is when it was effectively being applied to the purchase
price). 38 If a similar rule is applied to these transactions (and there
is no reason why it should not be), the partnership would be required
to recognize the full value of the rental. A major clue for the IRS
that a bargain rental has been created is the negative cash flow or
increase in rent after several years without any apparent economic
justification from the lessee's view point for that increase, i.e., there
is no corresponding enhancement in the value of the right of occu-
pancy.
While these transactions do not seem to have been challenged by
the IRS to date, they seem fairly vulnerable on these grounds.
37 Note 21, supra.
38 Other analysts are reported to have concluded that this arrangement is equiva-




Section 213(b) of the 1976 Act allows organization fees to be de-
ducted over 60 months. Syndication fees still may not be deducted.
Some promoters may attempt to allocate large amounts to the costs
of organizing the partnership, but these arrangements are unlikely
to stand up. Most start-up costs relate to the acquisition of the assets,
the financing, and the offering of units. Relatively little is charged
for actually preparing and filing the partnership's organizationL
documents. Therefore, it is unlikely that this will be a fruitful line
to develop.
It is not exactly clear when the 60 months commences. The statute
refers to "the month in which the partnership begins business. ."
In the case of real estate construction, this probably means when
construction starts, but the issue may not be completely settled.
K. FUTURE PROFITS
Apart from the Diamond issue, discussed below, other difficulties
can arise when future profits are allocated to a general partner in
consideration for his services as a promoter:
(1) In the first Larson case,39 the Government claimed that one
of the general partners was not a partner in the current year for pur-
poses of determining whether the organization was taxable as an
association because his interest in profits could not commence to pay
out until several years in the future.40
(2) As noted above, when profits interests shift, the reduction in
the shares of the limited partner may create problems under §751(b)
and §752.
(3) If the profits interest shifts only after substantial losses have
been realized, even if the "substantial economic effect" test is satis-
fied because capital accounts have been duly credited or charged and
control the distribution of cash and other assets, the courts might con-
clude that the shifting of profits and losses was a means of paying
part of the purchase price, as in the oil and gas area.4'
L. SUMMARY
Apart from the material distortion test, the main question in all
these situations is whether, in substance, the payment is a disguised
capital acquisition cost. Reasonableness of the payment for the serv-
ices actually to be rendered after completion of the construction or
other acquisition of an income producing asset is a key element in
obtaining satisfactory tax results. As for the material distortion test,
it is too early to tell whether the Government will be successful in
3' 65 T.C., No. 10(1975), withdrawn 11/7/75.
40 The Government was probably wrong on the issue. See the discussion on the
Frazell case, infra, with respect to the determination of an interest in profits.
41 See note 21, supra.
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disallowing all partnership deductions during the first two taxable
years in excess of the cash investment, or whether the IRS will even
press the issue to litigation. As a general proposition, it seems patent-
ly wrong, since there may be many reasons why a bona fide business
entity might lose substantial sums, and such losses often may exceed
the invested capital. Yet the IRS has prevailed in other cases in
which material distortion has been alleged on grounds that seemed
just as weak; thus, it is difficult to predict where the courts would end
up on this issue.
III. Partnership Interests in Consideration for Services
The second major approach mentioned at the beginning of this
article for compensating a general partner is to give him an interest
in the partnership in a form that will not trigger the recognition of
its value as income when received. If this is accomplished, he will
then be taxed on his distributive share of partnership profits and
losses as they are realized by the partnership. If the partnership
realizes and distributes capital gains, tax-free income or the non-
taxable proceeds of a mortgage refinancing, the general partner will
participate in that distribution and enjoy the same tax treatment as
the other partners; if he sells his interest, he hopefully will report any
profit as a long-term capital gain.
A. Interests in Capital
Prior to the decision in Sol Diamond,42 the conventional wisdom
was that a partner could receive an interest in a partnership in consid-
eration for his services and be taxed only to the extent that the
receipt of the interest constituted a transfer to him of an interest in
capital. This was based upon the apparent language of U.S. Treasury
Regulation §1.721-1(b)(1), which carefully distinguished between
interests in profits and interests in capital, and stated that the service
partner would be taxed to the extent of fair market value of the inter-
est in capital transferred. The regulations further provided that if the
transfer of the interest in capital was deferred until various restric-
tions lapsed or conditions had been satisfied, such as the rendition of
future services, the fair market value of the capital interest when the
restrictions lapsed or the conditions were satisfied would be recog-
nized at that time. The fact that the regulation went out of its way to
distinguish between interests in profits and interests in capital, and
then only stated that the fair market value of the latter was taxable,
seemed to be an acknowledgment that the value of the interest in
profits was not itself taxable.
Section 721 of the Code provides that no gain or loss will be recog-
nized by either the partners or the partnership upon the transfer of
property to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partner-
42 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir., 1974).
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ship.43 This provision was intended by Congress to settle certain
lingering doubts about the possibility that a contribution of appre-
ciated property might result in the recognition of gain. Neither §721
nor any other Code provision" covered contributions of services.
The regulations under this section attempted to fill the void, and
covered the tax treatment of services for interests in capital.
When the regulations were first proposed, 45 no distinction was
made between interests in profits and interests in capital. In response
to the criticisms of the commentators, the final version of the regula-
tions added the distinction between interests in capital and interests
in profits. The Treasury Department draftsmen specifically repre-
sented to various outside parties acting as special consultants to the
Treasury Department on the matter that the final regulations were
intentionally drafted to exclude from taxable income the value of an
interest in partnership profits.46
Numerous events between 1954 and 1971 seemed to confirm the
general understanding of the meaning of the regulations. Among
other things, the Solicitor General argued this position to the United
States Supreme Court while opposing a petition for certiorari in the
Frazell case.47 The Tax Court, holding that a partner had no basis for
an interest in profits, explained in a footnote that "[u]nder the regu-
lations, the mere receipt of a partnership interest in future profits
does not create any tax liability."4 As noted by the appellate court
in the Diamond case itself, there was a "startling degree of una-
nimity" among the commentators as to the meaning of the regula-
tion.49
Accordingly, the usual planning technique, prior to Diamond, was
to give the general partner or promoter an interest in the profits of
the partnership, being careful that he not receive any interest in capi-
tal. The regulation required gain to be recognized unless the investors
recouped their capital contributions before any distributions of capi-
tal were made to the general partner. Presumably, this did not pre-
vent the general partner from sharing in distributions of profits before
the investors had recouped their capital, nor did it prevent the capital
43 Under §7)2, if property transferred to the pa!rtnership is subject to a mortgage,
gain can be recognized, notwithstanding §721. See Reg. §1.752-1(c).
44 Prior to 1969, when §83 was added to the Code, there was no specific statutory
provision applicable to the exchange of services for property.
45 20 Fed. Reg. 5854(1955).
46Willis, Partnership Taxation §11.01 (1976). Mr. Willis was one of the outside
consultants.
47 United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d (5th Cir., 1964), reh. den. 339 F.2d 885, cert.
den., 380 U.S. 961 (1965), on remand, 269 F. Supp. 885 (D. La., 1967). The Solicitor
General's opinion is stated in the Brief for the U.S. in Opposition at 10, n.3
48 Herman M. Hale, T.C. Memo. 1965-274, n.3 (24 T.C.M. 1497, 1502).
49492 F.2d at 289. For a more complete review of the pre-Diamond history of the
regulation, see Cowan, "Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Considera-
tion For Services: The Diamond Case", 27 Tax L. Rev. 161 (1972). A similar review is
contained in the subsequent edition of Willis, note 46, supra.
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contributions of the limited partners from being reduced or eliminated
by allocations of losses, although the regulation was not very speci-
fic about these points.
As an example, if a limited partnership consisting of G as a general
partner and L as a limited partner was formed, G contributing only
services and L contributing $100 of cash, and if the partnership agree-
ment provided that each was to be allocated 50% of all profits and
losses, but that L was entitled to the first $100 of capital distributions,
G would not realize taxable income upon the formation of the part-
nership. If, however, G and L were entitled to share in all distributions
equally, including distributions of capital, G probably would have to
recognize as income the value of his 50% interest, or $100.50 The
regulations recognized that if a partner realizes income as the result
of a transfer of capital, the transferor partner or partnership may have
a corresponding deduction.
One difficulty with the regulation is determining exactly what is
meant by an interest in profits as compared to an interest in capital.
The decision in Frazell exemplifies the problem. The taxpayer was a
geologist who had certain valuable oil and gas maps. In a contract
which was found by the courts to constitute a partnership agreement,
two investors agreed to advance the cash required to explore and
develop a number of oil and gas prospects; Frazell agreed to contrib-
ute his maps to the venture and to render the necessary geological
services. After the investors had recouped their cash investment,
Frazell was to receive varying interests in the wells.5' If the agree-
ment were terminated before the investors had recouped all of their
money, Frazell was still entitled to his share of the wells to the extent
their values exceeded the unrecouped cash investments.
The venture was successful and after a few years the investors
had recovered substantially all of their investment, at which time the
partnership was incorporated. Frazell received 13% of the stock of the
corporation. He argued that he had transferred his partnership inter-
est to the corporation in exchange for stock, a non-taxable trans-
action under §351 of the 1954 Code. The Fifth Circuit held, essenti-
ally, that the liquidation of the old partnership constituted a taxable
event, regardless of the added factor that a tax-free incorporation was
involved, because at that time, there had also been a transfer of an
interest in capital conveyed to Frazell, and this was taxable under
the §721 regulations.
50 The computation is as follows: Since L received only a 50% interest in the part-
nership for his $100, the combined value of all of the partnership interests after G has
contributed his services must be $200. Since G has a 50% interest in the total profits
and losses of the partnership as well as in its capital, his interest must also be worth
$100. In effect, G must capitalize, and is taxed on, the value of his own services, which
in this case is $100.
51 The exact percentage in each well varied upon the type of well, its depth, the
nature of the royalty interest acquired, etc.
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On rehearing, Frazeli argued that he had had an interest in profits
from the start, that his 13% interest in the corporation represented his
share of the profits and, therefore, that there was no transfer of capi-
tal when the partnership incorporated. The appellate court rejec-
ted this argument on the grounds that all of the income during the
life of the partnership had been allocated and distributed to the inves-
tors.
The Frazell decision was probably wrong on this last point. Frazell
did have an interest in profits at all times. What he did not have was a
right to withdraw his share of the profits. In effect, he was required
to contribute his share of profits to the partnership's capital until the
total of his capital contributions was proportionate to his share of the
profits - a situation that would occur at "pay-out" for the investors. 52
Therefore, he could withdraw his proportionate share the same as the
others.
Most commentators define a partner's interest in capital at any
given moment as his right to receive a distribution of partnership
assets at that time. 53 By contrast, an interest in profits is a right to
a share in any increase in the capital of the partnership over a period
of time, either through revenues from outside sources or by reason of
the increase in the value of the assets themselves; an interest in losses
is the converse of an interest in profits.54 From this perspective, it is
clear that Frazell's equity in the partnership assets was in fact increas-
ing gradually over the life of the partnership, and did not make a large
quantum jump from zero to 13% only at the moment of incorporation.
Had the partnership liquidated at any intermediate point, Frazell
would have been entitled to approximately 13% of the profits, both
realized and unrealized, of the partnership to that date. Apart from
this and perhaps several other uncertainties in defining the exact
parameters of what was meant by an interest in profits, most prac-
ticing attorneys familiar with the subject did not have any serious
problems with the concept.
Once a partner had received an interest in profits, it seemed clear
that he could share in long-term capital gains, distributions of mort-
gage refinancing proceeds and similar items in the same way as any
other partner. There was some concern, especially after the decision
52 For a more detailed explanation of this point, see Cowan, "G.C.M. 22730 and
Subchapter K: What Choice for the Driller?", 26th Annual Inst. on 0. & G. Law and
Tax. 353(1975).
53 E.g., Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapter C, J and K
of the Internal Revenue Code, before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 54, 141 (1959).
54 Some semantic difficulty occurs here because financial statements usually reflect
only book values (i.e., historical costs) of capital accounts, rather than fair market
values, whereas the focus under Reg. §1.721-1 (and many other provisions of sub-
chapter K) is on fair market values. In analyzing the tax and accounting concepts in
subchapter K, it is important to keep this distinction in mind, and be aware of which
one is meant in the particular context being considered.
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in Hale,55 that a partner who received an interest in profits would
recognize ordinary income rather than capital gains if he were to sell
his interest to a third party. This raised the possibility that he would
also recognize ordinary income upon the receipt of any distributions
from the partnership.
This outcome seemed to go too far, however, in denying the service
partner his right to receive capital gains treatment with respect to
subsequent increases in the value of the capital assets of the partner-
ship, including its good will. Where the owner of the profits interest
was also burdened by a share of losses and was liable on his share of
partnership debts, he was doing more than merely contributing ser-
vices and receiving compensation for those services. He had a pro-
prietary interest in the partnership, with both its risks and burdens.
A sale of such an interest is more than a mere assignment of rights
to income, and capital gains treatment is not inappropriate for a sale
of a proprietary position.
The problem became acute if one attempted to distinguish between
a partner who contributed only services, another partner who contri-
buted a small amount of cash along with services, and a third part-
ner who contributed a substantial amount of cash, and only a small
amount of services. In Hale, the Tax Court found that a sale of an
interest in profits resulted in the realization of ordinary income; the
facts of that case, however, were somewhat complex and the court
was able to invoke §751, so that the rule for more ordinary situations
remained unsettled.
B. Section 83
In 1969, Congress added §83 to the Internal Revenue Code.
Although aimed primarily at corporation executives who received
restricted stock, §83 applies whenever property is used to pay for
services. With certain exceptions not here relevant, the fair market
value of the transferred property must be included in income when
received unless the interest is forfeitable and non-transferable. If it
is forfeitable and non-transferable, its value when the restrictions
lapse will be ordinary income at that time. The taxpayer may elect
under §83(b) to include the value of the interest in income when re-
ceived even though it is forfeitable and non-transferable. The major
advantage of making the election is to assure that any subsequent
appreciation in value will be realized as capital gain.
Section 83(h) provides that the person to whom the services are
rendered may deduct the amount included in the income of the per-
son who performs the services. The proposed regulations under §83,
insofar as they apply to partnership transactions, merely repeat the
language of the regulations under §721, that the value of the capital
55 Note 48, supra.
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account would be deemed taxable when received. No mention is made
of an interest in profits.
The proposed regulations under §83 also provide that when prop-
erty is transferred in consideration for services, the transferee will
not be deemed the owner of the property until he is taxed on its value
under §83.56 Accordingly, if the interest is non-transferable and for-
feitable and an election is not made under §83(b), any distributions
received with respect to the property will be deemed additional com-
pensation rather than income from the asset. Thus, dividends received
with respect to stock would be deductible by the corporation as com-
pensation paid, rather than as a dividend.
This seems to indicate that if a person receives an interest in a
partnership under circumstances where he was not taxed under §83,
he would not be recognized as a partner for purposes of subchapter
K. As a result, he would not be entitled to deduct his share of partner-
ship losses or claim his share of partnership credits, and he would
have to pay ordinary income tax on any distributions made to him,
even though they were his distributive share of partnership long-term
capital gains, non-taxable mortgage refinancing proceeds, or tax-free
interest, among other things.
C. Interest in Profits
With this background, the Tax Court's decision in Diamond came as
an unwelcome surprise to the tax bar. In Diamond, a business asso-
ciate of the taxpayer had a contract to purchase an office building.
He offered Diamond a share of the profits in his deal if Diamond could
obtain suitable financing for the acquisition. Diamond subsequently
obtained 100% non-recourse financing, and received a 60% interest in
profits. Less than three weeks after the closing, Diamond sold his 60%
interest in the deal back to the business associate for $40,000. On his
tax return, he claimed that this represented a short-term capital gain
realized on the sale of a partnership interest, which gain was offset
by long-term capital losses that he had realized from other trans-
actions. The Government initially took the position, inter alia, that
the sale of an interest in partnership profits produced ordinary in-
come, not short-term capital gain, so that there could be no offset.
In the Tax Court, Government counsel also argued that the arrange-
ment amounted to a sham, in which a $40,000 brokerage fee to
Diamond was disguised as an interest in a partnership. At no time
prior to the end of the trial did Government counsel claim that the
receipt of an interest in partnership profits was taxable as ordinary
income. This argument was raised only at the very end of its post-trial
brief, and in a very cursory manner.
The Tax Court declined to decide whether the transaction was a
sham, or whether the sale of an interest in profits produced ordinary
56 Prop. Reg. §§ 1.83-] (a) and 1 .83-4(a)( 1971).
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income. It disposed of the case by holding that the receipt of an inter-
est in profits was taxable as ordinary income and, in this case, the
value of the interest received was exactly $40,000. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the decision created numerous
problems, such as the apparent double tax on the same income (once
when the interest in profits was created and then again when the prof-
its themselves were earned). Although it noted the analysts' uniform
consensus to the contrary and their criticisms of the lower court's deci-
sion, the appellate court affirmed on the basis of the presumed exper-
tise of the Tax Court and the IRS.
At no time did anyone at a policy-making level in the Treasury
Department ever consciously take the position that the receipt of an
interest in profits was taxable. That argument had been raised by a
local attorney in the Regional Counsel's Office, and even then only
cursorily, in an attempt to protect the revenue in a particular case,
without adequate research and probably without even checking the
master jacket in Washington on the intended meaning of the regu-
lation. During the entire time the Diamond appeal was pending,
which was over three years, the Treasury Department refused to
issue any rulings on the Diamond issue; further, in every private
ruling in which the issue might have been present, it expressly re-
served judgment on the matter: to all intents, it confessed that, even
after the Tax Court's decision, Treasury did not take the position that
the receipt of an interest in profits was taxable. The Seventh Circuit
confused arguments of counsel for expertise.
Assuming Diamond is correct, however, several conclusions appear
inevitable, including the following:
1. After 1969, §83 applies to the receipt of an interest in partner-
ship profits. If the interest is forfeitable and not transferable and no
elections made under §83(b), actual distributions of profits to a part-
ner will be taxed as ordinary income, regardless of the source of the
funds, until the restrictions lapse.
2. Any time a partner receives an interest in profits that is pro-
portionately larger than his contribution to capital, the excess may
be deemed an interest in profits received in exchange for services and
its value taxed on receipt.
3. Any increase in a service partner's share of profits is probably
taxable.
4. Once the partner includes in income the value of his interest
in profits, he should be deemed to have purchased the partnership
interest for the cash equivalent of that income. Thereafter, he should
be treated the same as any other purchaser of a partnership interest
and, upon sale of his interest, he should be entitled to capital gains
treatment.
An interesting situation arises when the interest in profits is trans-
ferred to a partner in a transaction that generates a deduction at the
partnership level. For example, if the general partner is a driller in an
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oil and gas partnership, the value of the interest conveyed to him may
constitute an intangible drilling expense fully deductible by the part-
nership. In such cases, it would appear that the deduction can be allo-
cated to the service partner himself.5 7 Where this can be arranged,
the taxpayers come out far ahead under Diamond. Whatever the value
of the interest in profits may be is academic, because that amount is
both included in the income of the service partner and deducted by
him. Accordingly, the receipt of the interest results in a wash on his
tax return. However, he now is deemed to have purchased his interest,
and there should be no further doubt about his right to capital gain
treatment upon a subsequent disposition. This is probably one rea-
son why the Treasury Department has been reported to be consider-
ing a retreat from its victory in Diamond; perhaps, as the Seventh
Circuit itself suggested, this retreat will be effected by restricting
the applicability of the decision to those cases where the services have
been rendered completely prior to the receipt of the partnership inter-
est and that interest can be easily valued.
Another planning possibility for avoiding the impact of Diamond is
to make sure that the interest in profits is received long before it has
substantial value. One cause of the difficulty in Diamond was the fact
that the partnership was not formed until after the services were ren-
dered and the interest had acquired substantial value. Had Diamond
and his business associate formed the partnership before the finan-
cing had been actively sought, the interest in profits would not have
had a significant value. Yet, this was merely a matter of semantics,
controlled by the draftsman of the partnership agreement. The essen-
tial rights of the parties were not affected by when the partnership
was deemed to have commenced, and a mere change in the language
of the agreement, to provide that the partnership was formed imme-
diately and would be dissolved if the financing were not obtained,
would have avoided the whole problem.
Service partners also must now consider filing an election under
§83(b) to include in income the value of a partnership interest in prof-
its as soon as it is received in order to avoid the possible adverse ef-
fects of not being deemed a partner under subchapter K, and having
to include as ordinary income any subsequent distributions or appre-
ciation in the value of the interest.
Where the interest is received in a transaction that does not gen-
erate an immediate deduction to the partnership, it should create
additional basis for some or all of the depreciable assets of the part-
nership. The additional depreciation deductions can be allocated to
the service partner. His profits interest can be made non-transferable
and forfeitable, and the restrictions on forfeitability and trans-
-' The suggestion that the deduction may be allocated to the service partner and
that such an allocation has "substantial economic effect" were first made in this
author's article in Tax Law Review, note 49, supra. Numerous other authors have
subsequently come to the same conclusion; Willis regards it as a matter of "common
sense". Partnership Taxation § 11.01 (1976).
TAX CONFERENCE
ferability could lapse at a rate approximately equal to the deprecia-
tion write-off period. This, again, would create offsetting items of
income and deduction, resulting in a wash on the tax return.58 A
similar result might be obtained by limiting the life of the interest in
profits and amortizing the service partner's basis in his partnership
interest over that limited life. 59
Another alternative is to avoid specifying the promoter as a general
partner to begin with. If he becomes an employee of the partnership,
the partnership can agree to pay him compensation for his services
measured by the profits of the venture. He will then be taxed only as
the profits are paid to him.6° The partnership probably could deduct
the payments as made, even though the services rendered by the em-
ployee normally must be capitalized, since the capitalized costs would
be amortizable at exactly the same rate as the pay-out. 61 The only
disadvantage of classifying him as an employee is that he would fore-
go his right to favorable treatment on his share of long-term capital
gains, mortgage refinancing proceeds, and similar items. Also, if
a large capital gain is realized or a substantial distribution out of
mortgage refinancing is made, the partnership may have difficulty
sustaining the deduction under §162; even if it can show that the
amount paid was ordinary and necessary, the deduction may be too
large to produce a full benefit.
SUMMARY
It is still not clear whether Treasury will press its victory in
Diamond. In the meantime, tax planners have several techniques for
avoiding the adverse implications of Diamond and, in some cases can
make that decision work to the advantage of their clients.
58 Technically, there could be a problem in that the basis of the partnership assets
might be increased only by the amounts included each year in income by the service
partner, so that the additional depreciation allowable in the early years would be
negligible. However the principle of Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. 979 (1945) should
be sufficient to overcome this difficulty.
59 See Peter P. Risko, 26 T.C. 485 (1956) (acq. in result only).
60 See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
61 See Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. 979 (1945).
